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Abstract
This article analyses Sri Lanka’s April 2010 parliamentary elections as they
played out in the Muslim community on the east coast. The political work of
elections, as the article shows, involves a lot more than the composition of
government. Antagonism over group identities and boundaries are at centre
stage. Elections force people to show their colours, which causes turbulence as
they grapple with several, possibly contradictory, loyalties. The article argues
that elections bring together different political storylines, rather than one master
antagonism. It is the interaction between different narratives that paradoxically
provides elections both with a sense of gravity and dignity, and with the lingering
threat of rupture and disturbance.
Introduction
This article analyses the evolution of the 2010 parliamentary elections
in Trincomalee, a peripheral district on Sri Lanka’s east coast. It
conceptualizes elections as a powerful political moment of ritual and
spectacle in which more fundamental societal narratives converge
and collide. By exploring the politics of a particular community—Sri
Lanka’s second largest minority: the Muslims—in the immediate post-
war context, the article foregrounds the dynamics of crafting group
boundaries, moral communities, and vertical loyalties. And it argues
∗ For valuable help during the field research, the author would like to thank Shahul
Hasbullah, Jasmy, and Mubarak. Mr Ajiwadeen’s archival research is also gratefully
acknowledged. Many thanks are also due to Mukulika Banerjee, Ward Berenschot,
Sarah Byrne, Georg Frerks, Timmo Gaasbeek, Urs Geiser, Benedikt Korf, Jonathan
Spencer, and two anonymous reviewers who provided constructive feedback on earlier
drafts of this article. For help with the drafting of the map, I am indebted to Marc
Vis.
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that it is these contentions that account for the state of excitement,
the intrigue, and the sense of anxiety that elections tend to evoke.
The political work that elections do reaches well beyond the electoral
moment itself. Elections do not just bring about the composition of
a new parliament. They involve the active crafting, activating, and
rearranging of political identities. This conceptualization emerges
from a set of recent ethnographic forays into democratic politics.1
My main point of reference lies with Jonathan Spencer’s work on
politics, violence, and the state in South Asia.2 Steering clear of the
cold arithmetic that often characterizes electoral studies, Spencer
posits that elections are ‘moral dramas of identity and difference’.3
They produce and reproduce antagonistic political identities, thus
activating boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. They dramatize
collective citizenship, but they also expose divisions, thus opening a
register of disturbance and transgression.
My emphasis on antagonism and identity politics does not
imply that more rational or interest-based dimensions of politics—
be they consensus-seeking or clientelism—are irrelevant. But, to
adopt Mukulika Banerjee’s phrasing, a purely interest-based or
functionalist understanding of politics is a little ‘threadbare’.4 Such
an understanding is poorly positioned to engage with the powerful
performative and carnivalesque dimensions of politics. Putting
political identities and antagonism at the heart of our analysis helps
to explain why people invest energy in politics, even when they are
unlikely to receive many benefits from their politicians. And it brings
1 M. Banerjee (2008) ‘Democracy, Sacred and Everyday: An Ethnographic Case
from India’, in J. Paley (ed.) Democracy: Anthropological Perspectives, Santa Fe: School of
Advanced Research Press, pp. 63–95; M. Banerjee (2011) ‘Elections as Communitas’,
Social Research, 78 (1), pp. 75–98; W. Berenschot (2011) Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim
Violence and the India State, London: Hurst; R. Bertrand, J.-L. Briquet and P. Pels
(eds) (2007) Cultures of Voting: The Hidden History of the Secret Ballot, London: Hurst; J.
Cupples (2009) ‘Rethinking Electoral Geography: Spaces and Practices of Democracy
in Nicaragua’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, NS 34, pp. 110–124;
J. Harriss, K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds) (2004) Politicising Democracy: The New
Local Politics of Democratisation, Basingstoke: Palgrave; J. Paley (ed.) (2008) Democracy:
Anthropological Perspectives, Santa Fe: School of Advanced Research Press.
2 J. Spencer (2003) ‘A Nation “Living in Different Places”: Notes on the Impossible
Work of Purification in Postcolonial Sri Lanka’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 37 (1),
pp. 1–23; J. Spencer (2007) Anthropology, Politics and the State: Democracy and Violence in
South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; J. Spencer (2008) ‘A Nationalism
without Politics? The Illiberal Consequences of Liberal Institutions in Sri Lanka’, Third
World Quarterly, 29 (3), pp. 611–629.
3 Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State, p. 78.
4 Banerjee, ‘Democracy, Sacred, and Everyday’, p. 73.
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to the fore that South Asia’s more troubling forms of contestation—
ranging from election violence to communal riots, pogroms, and even
war—are not altogether antithetical to democratic politics, but closely
related to it.
These explorations in political anthropology resonate with the case
discussed in this article. Political identity issues featured saliently
in Sri Lanka’s 2010 parliamentary elections. The polls provided an
occasion for people to define themselves in relation to others (us and
them) and in relation to the state (citizens of a democratic nation). The
importance of group boundaries may seem straightforward in the Sri
Lankan context. Given that the island recently emerged from nearly
three decades of armed separatist conflict fought along ethno-political
lines, one would be surprised not to find a measure of antagonism
between Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims during the first post-war
elections. While these fault lines indeed play a salient role, ethnic
othering is only part of the story. There are several other forms of
antagonism and political identifications, driven by personal ties, town-
based rivalries, and the enactment of national citizenship. People
belong to more than one ‘us’ in relation to more than one ‘them’,
and there is a substantial amount of reshuffling in terms of which
‘friends’ will engage with which ‘foes’. The force field between different
political loyalties and antagonisms stands at the core of the electoral
dynamics I encountered. Elections temporarily intensify interactions
between the nation, different group identities, and the individual. This
accounts for elections’ sense of gravity. The casting of an individual
opinion becomes an act of citizenship. And it accounts for the fear of
rupture that elections bring. People need to show their colours, but
they cannot satisfy all their loyalties with only one vote.
This case study makes a more fundamental point about the
complexity of political landscapes and the need to take multiple
political identities seriously. The powerful role of such identities—
be they based on religion, ethnicity, caste, place, nationality or
otherwise—is acknowledged in scholarly work on Sri Lankan politics5
and, more widely, in the literature on South Asia, a region troubled
5 J. Uyangoda (2005) ‘Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Imagination and Democratic
Alternatives for Sri Lanka’, Futures, 37, pp. 959–988; R. Venugopal (2009)
‘Cosmopolitan Capitalism and Sectarian Socialism: Conflict, Development, and the
Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka’, PhD thesis, University of Oxford; N. Wickremesinghe
(2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age. A History of Contested Identities, London: Hurst.
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by exclusivist ideologies like Hindutva and communal riots,6 caste
politics,7 and separatist struggles.8 This article seeks to complement
the scholarly record on political contestation in South Asia by
bringing to the foreground the interaction between different identity
struggles. Although ethnic division remains the most prominent
political cleavage, it is severely complicated by other kinds of us–
them divisions, certainly in Trincomalee, but plausibly in many other
parts of South Asia as well. A lot of political effort is invested in
arranging the different forms of antagonism, in (re)enacting identities
and (de)activating boundaries, and it is that kind of work that elections
do.
Preceded by a brief conceptual and contextual background, the
core of this article comprises a chronological account of the elections
in Trincomalee’s Muslim pockets. The fieldwork underpinning this
article was done in the period January to May 2010, but builds on
a longer term engagement with eastern Sri Lanka and more or less
annual field visits over the past decade.9
The political work of elections: defining ourselves, our others,
and the state
Spencer’s inspiring exploration of ‘political modernity’ in South Asia10
weaves together a broad intellectual canvas—traversing questions of
6 Berenschot, Riot Politics; P. Brass (2003) The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in
Contemporary India, Seattle: University of Washington Press; T. Hansen (2001) Wages
of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay, Princeton: Princeton University
Press; H. Spodek (2010) ‘In the Hindutva Laboratory: Pogroms and Politics in Gujarat,
2002’, Modern Asian Studies, 44 (2), pp. 349–399; S. Tambiah (2005) ‘Urban Riots
and Cricket in South Asia: A Postscript to “Leveling Crowds”’, Modern Asian Studies,
39 (4), pp. 897–927; S. Wilkinson (2004) Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and
Ethnic Riots in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7 A. Doron (2010) ‘Caste Away? Subaltern Engagement With the Modern Indian
State’, Modern Asian Studies, 44 (4), pp. 753–783; D. Roy (2012) ‘Caste and Power: An
Ethnography in West Bengal, India’, Modern Asian Studies, 46 (4), pp. 947–974.
8 L. Gayer and C. Jaffrelot (eds) (2009) Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists,
Maoists, and Separatists, New York: Columbia University Press.
9 The fieldwork in 2010 comprised 136 interviews (in English or with translation),
observations of election rallies, speeches and so-called pocket meetings, perusal of
(English language) newspapers, and archival research on Trincomalee’s electoral
history (by Mr Ajiwadeen). All quotes in this article are taken from these interviews,
unless otherwise attributed.
10 Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State, p. 3.
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democracy and secularism; citizenship, nationalism and the nation-
state; war and peace—with reflections on ‘the political’. He draws on
scholarly proponents of ‘radical democracy’ who revisit the intellectual
legacy of the German political theorist Carl Schmitt to argue that a
deliberational and consensus-oriented understanding of democracy
overlooks the very essence of politics.11 Adversarial positions are
not just the result of clashing interests (which could be addressed
with rational problem-solving), they are at the heart of what politics
is. Antagonism between us and them, so the argument goes, is
constitutive of politics. This takes us beyond the space of formal politics
and directs us to more existential and morally charged questions
around how people define themselves politically.
Debates on ‘the political’ have strong Western antecedents, but
Spencer posits that the central idea has great purchase on political
contestation in South Asia. This becomes particularly clear in his
discussion of electoral politics—‘dramas of identity and difference’—
with which I engage in this article. Importantly, political identities are
not merely expressed during elections, they are enacted through them.12
Elections involve hard political work—to reify identities, to perform
registers of loyalty and belonging, and to activate (or deactivate)
social boundaries. It is these processes that make elections such a
turbulent and potentially disturbing phenomenon. In Spencer’s words,
‘the carnivalesque space of the political is a space of possibility and
licence: licence to argue, and licence to joke, and licence to experiment
with challenges to the order of things. It is, for this reason, also a space
of danger, anxiety, and concern.’13
Although Spencer leaves this somewhat implicit, such an
interpretation requires us to depart from the rigid dichotomies that
typify the radical democracy debate, which foregrounds antagonism
along the received left–right spectrum. There are several kinds of
us and several kinds of them. It is a common theme in Sri Lankan
politics, and elsewhere in South Asia, that the politics of caste, class,
ethnicity, religion, ideology, and regional disparity—to name the most
salient examples—often produce different kinds of cleavages. In Sri
Lanka, the common wisdom is that ethnicity trumps class, caste, and
11 Common references include: E. Laclau and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso; C. Mouffe (2005)
On the Political, London: Routledge.
12 Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State, pp. 76–78.
13 Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State, p. 94.
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region, and partly because of that, the island became entangled in
an ethno-secessionist war. While this is largely true, other identities,
boundaries, and political antagonisms have clearly not disappeared.14
Contestation along other-than-ethnic lines severely complicates the
political picture, and—importantly—this not only causes academic
head scratching; it is, in fact, an acute challenge for voters too.
While contradictory loyalties evoke a sense of anxiety and possible
rupture, the bringing together of different identities also dramatizes
the bond between citizens and their state. This provides electoral
performance with ritual qualities and a sense of gravity. Villages
suddenly matter to the nation. Powerful people act out their bonds with
the community. People’s individual vote becomes an act of citizenship,
which some of them take on as a duty of nearly religious proportions.
In this connection, Banerjee coins the term ‘sacred elections’ in her
ethnography of elections in West Bengal, India.15 Seen from such a
ritual perspective, electoral performance not only bestows on voters
an aura of prominence, it also affirms the legitimacy of the political
system. Elections, in other words, can also be understood as a form
of subjectivation. They turn people into registered voters, and thus
subjects of state rule.16
Spencer’s phrase ‘drama of unity and difference’ is well chosen,
because it covers both aspects of elections. On the one hand,
it captures the spectacle, intrigue, and transgression around
antagonistic identities. And, on the other hand, it alludes to the
dignified performance of citizenship that affirms the indivisibility
and righteousness of the system. As we will see below, in the case
of Trincomalee’s Muslims, people need to show their colours during
elections and this evokes partly overlapping and partly contradictory
narratives of loyalty and belonging.
Identity politics in Sri Lanka
The case discussed in this article is something of an anomaly. First
of all, Sri Lanka is one of just a few countries where elections
and democratic changes of government continued despite protracted
14 Venugopal, ‘Cosmopolitan Capitalism’; Wickremesinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern
Age.
15 Banerjee, ‘Democracy, Sacred, and Everyday’.
16 Bertrand, Briquet and Pels, Cultures of Voting.
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armed conflicts, most obviously the Tamil separatist war in the
northeast (1980s–2009), but Sinhala Marxist uprisings elsewhere in
the country as well (1970s and 1980s). Secondly, the elections of
April 2010 were unique. They were the first parliamentary elections
to take place after the war and, unlike many other elections, it was
more or less clear from the start that the Rajapaksa government
would win, riding high on its military victory and Sinhala patriotism.
Thirdly, the article focuses on the Muslim community, which does
not normally feature saliently in political analyses of Sri Lanka. This
article thus tells the story of a particular population group, in a
particular country, at a particular time. However, the central point—
about people having to show their political colours and the flurry of
socio-political behaviour that stems from this—is more fundamental.
It sheds light on the nature of politics in Sri Lanka and it resonates
with political contestation in other parts of the world.
The problematic relationship between Sri Lanka’s democratic
politics and Tamil separatism is well studied.17 The island inherited
its political infrastructure from British colonial rule, but electoral
dynamics after independence developed a distinct ethno-nationalist
tone. The perceived need to redress the colonial grievances of the
Sinhala majority (73 per cent)18 resulted in pro-Sinhala policies. The
two main parties—the United National Party and its early breakaway
faction, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party—meanwhile developed a
ferocious rivalry, which not only resulted in alternating capitalist
(United National Party) and socialist (Sri Lanka Freedom Party)
orientations, but also in competitive Sinhala nationalism. The Tamil
minority (13 per cent) parties gradually shifted from advocating
minority rights to outright separatism, which then evolved into the
protracted civil war between the government and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereafter LTTE).
The introduction of a proportional representation system and a
powerful executive presidency in 1978 ended the supremacy of the
two mainstream parties to the benefit of the smaller ones—each
with a distinct ethnic profile—who became ‘kingmakers’, capable of
17 S. Bastian (2005) ‘Electoral Systems and Political Outcomes’, Law and
Society Trust Review, 15 (210), pp. 18–25; Uyangoda, ‘Ethnic Conflict’; Venugopal,
‘Cosmopolitan Capitalism’; Wickremesinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age.
18 Population statistics are based on the author’s calculations, using 2007 census
data taken from: Department of Census and Statistics (2007) ‘Basic Population
Information on Trincomalee District—2007, Preliminary Report Based on Special
Enumeration—2007’ [ISBN 978-955-577-616-5].
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tipping the balance in favour of either mainstream party. Proportional
representation, however, bolstered the salience of Sinhala nationalism
and led to unstable coalition politics, which continued to exclude
minority parties that were unwilling to trade their principles for
patronage.19 This tendency was reinforced by the introduction of
preferential votes and the creation of a national list (of unelected
members of parliament that were assigned by the biggest parties),
which shifted importance to individual members and their ability to
cross over.
Muslim politics
With about 1.6 million people, the Muslim community forms Sri
Lanka’s second-largest minority (9 per cent). They live dispersed
across the country, but some of the largest Muslim settlements are
located in the east. The Muslims have close cultural and linguistic
links with the Tamils, but the escalation of ethnic violence in the
1980s and 1990s drove a wedge between the two communities. After
decades of Sinhala and Tamil nationalism, the Muslims thus joined
the fray with their own discourse of ethnic rights and belonging.20
The political coming of age of the Muslims was closely associated
with the creation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (hereafter the
‘Muslim Congress’, its common short name) in the early 1980s, and
with the proliferation of Islamic reform movements, which bolstered
the salience of a Muslim identity.21 The formation of the Muslim
Congress was also a response to the war. The everyday reality of
violence, extortion, and intimidation in the northeast hardened ethnic
fault lines and demanded stronger political leadership to speak on
behalf of the besieged Muslim community.22
19 Bastian, ‘Electoral Systems’.
20 D. McGilvray (2011) ‘Sri Lankan Muslims: Between Ethno-Nationalism and the
Global Ummah’, Nations and Nationalism, 17 (1), pp. 45–64.
21 F. Haniffa (2008) ‘Piety as Politics Amongst Muslim Women in Contemporary Sri
Lanka’, Modern Asian Studies, 42 (2/3), pp. 347–375; B. Klem (2011) ‘Islam, Politics
and Violence in Eastern Sri Lanka’, Journal of Asian Studies, 70 (3), pp. 730–753;
McGilvray, ‘Sri Lankan Muslims’.
22 J. Goodhand, B. Klem and B. Korf (2009) ‘Religion, Conflict and Boundary
Politics in Sri Lanka’, European Journal for Development Research, 21 (5), pp. 679–898; S.
Hasbullah and B. Korf (2009) ‘Muslim Geographies and the Politics of Purification
in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 30,
pp. 248–264; D. McGilvray and M. Raheem (2007) Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan
Conflict, Policy Studies 41, Washington DC: East West Center.
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The Muslim Congress inserted a unified Muslim voice into Sri
Lankan politics. Although it adopted a more militant Muslim
rhetoric, it nonetheless joined whichever party entered government
in order to secure ministerial positions and resources. Whereas a
principled agenda of Muslim rights worked to unite the Muslim
electorate, patronage produced a divisive impulse. After the death
of its founding father in 2000, the Muslim Congress could no
longer keep its fragmented Muslim pockets together. Rauf Hakeem
won the succession struggle, but renegade members of parliament
created their own electoral machines: the National Unity Alliance,
the National Congress, and the All Ceylon Muslim Congress. Dissent
intensified when the Muslim Congress entered opposition benches in
2004, while the various factions joined the government to safeguard
benefits for their constituencies.
The tendency to vote for pragmatic, town-based members of
parliament did not sit well, however, with Muslim concerns about
the peace talks between the insurgent LTTE and the government (in
2002–2003 and in 2006). Muslim leaders played no significant role in
the process and this raised acute anxieties. Worried that their political
leaders were arranging deckchairs on the Titanic while the future
of their community was at stake, young people, academics, religious
leaders, and activists called for a more solid, principled defence of
Muslim rights and needs.23 These concerns persisted when the peace
talks collapsed and the war resumed in 2006. The tension between
the Muslim rights agenda (minority issues) and ‘development’ (town-
based patronage) continues and this tension accounts for much of
the internal fracturing that plagues the Muslim community today.
Although the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 took away some
of the original raison d’être of the Muslim Congress, Muslim anxieties
about Sinhala domination, land ‘colonization’, and the government’s
military presence have increased. At the same time, the influx of post-
war resources and the construction of infrastructure add urgency to
their need to be in government. The Muslim polity thus continues
to navigate the difficult terrain of a besieged community that lives
dispersed between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority and
cannot afford to completely alienate either.
23 Klem, ‘Islam, Politics and Violence’; McGilvray and Raheem, Muslim Perspectives.
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Ethnic geography and electoral politics in Trincomalee
Trincomalee is an old harbour town on Sri Lanka’s east coast. Most
of the District’s population lives along the Koddiyar Bay that provides
natural shelter to the harbour. As is the case in most of eastern Sri
Lanka, one finds alternating Tamil and Muslim settlements along
the coastline. Wet rice cultivation has long been a central part of
everyday life in these communities; paddy fields typically start right
at the edge of town. Moving to the interior, one traverses an open
landscape with numerous small pockets of trees, houses, and temples,
lying like islands in a sea of paddy fields. Trincomalee’s only interior
settlement of significance is the predominantly Sinhala town, Kantale.
Large parts of the interior comprise late colonial and post-colonial
irrigation schemes, which are controversial because they brought
a significant population to the hitherto sparsely inhabited interior
areas, thus altering the ethnic demography of the region.24 What
was a predominantly Tamil-speaking area (Muslims and Tamils) has
gradually become a tri-ethnic district in the past century comprising
45 per cent Muslims, 29 per cent Tamils, and 25 per cent Sinhalese.25
Most of the uncultivated parts of the interior comprise a scrubby
jungle which until recently provided shelter for the LTTE. Up until
2006, the Tamil insurgents maintained de facto rule along the coastline
of Muthur and Ichchalampattu Division and had significant leverage
over civilian life throughout the District.26
The Muslim community was heavily affected by the Tamil
insurgency. Many of their paddy lands became inaccessible, they were
forced to pay ‘taxes’, and different forms of intimidation, coercion,
and kidnapping were an everyday reality. The insecurity of peripheral
areas inadvertently bolstered urbanization. Satellite villages were
abandoned and the larger Muslim towns became ever-denser homes
to the growing Muslim population. The tragedy of the 2004 tsunami
caused additional processes of displacement, resettlement, and
relocation. Kinniya is a particularly densely populated and almost
exclusively Muslim hub. Towns like Muthur, Pulmoddai, Kuchchaveli,
24 T. Gaasbeek (2010) ‘Bridging Troubled Waters? Everyday Inter-ethnic
Interaction in a Context of Violent Conflict in Kottiyar Pattu, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka’,
PhD thesis, Wageningen University.
25 Data taken from: Department of Census and Statistics (2007) ‘Basic Population
Information on Trincomalee District—2007’.
26 B. Klem (2012) ‘In the Eye of the Storm: Sri Lanka’s Front-Line Civil Servants
in Transition’, Development and Change, 43 (3), pp. 695–717.
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and Thoppur are also predominantly Muslim, though one will find
Tamil pockets in and around these rural towns. Trincomalee town is
ethnically mixed; Tampalakamam is largely Tamil. Map 1 sketches
the District’s ethnic geography and indicates the main population
centres.
Most Muslim towns consist of an old centre with a well-established
mosque, a respected school, and a main street with shops, traders
and some food stalls. These older parts are typically inhabited by a
relatively well-to-do class of landowners and people with government
jobs, who may do some small-scale farming or fishery on the side.
The sprawl of houses around the approach roads is usually of more
recent date and home to a class of wage labourers, though modern
education has facilitated access to white collar and entrepreneurial
jobs as well. Along the beaches, one typically finds communities of
fishermen, whose social standing is modest, though boat owners may
accumulate significant capital. The Muslim community does not have
a caste system, but the perceived hierarchy between livelihoods and
associated marriage (and inheritance) practices bear some semblance
to one.27 These general spatial economic patterns among the Muslim
community—though clearly not absolute—are often reflected in
micro-level electoral geography. While there is a significant amount
of fluctuation, the petit bourgeoisie in the town centres tends to have
a leaning towards the United National Party, while neighbourhoods
of daily labourers and fishermen have historically lent credence to the
supposedly proletarian profile of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
The creation of the Muslim Congress, which entered the arena as
an advocate of the Muslim cause, has complicated these patterns. It
gained especially strong support from the lower classes, particularly
those who lived in more peripheral areas, close to the threat of
LTTE violence and far away from established political patrons. This is
especially clear in Muthur. The town is known as a Muslim Congress
bastion, the ‘jetty area’ in particular, and this is unsurprising. It has
large concentrations of wage labourers and fishermen and it was a
border town throughout the war: LTTE control over the surrounding
forests called for strong Muslim leadership. Finally, it was through
the Muslim Congress that constituencies like Muthur, which are not
populous enough to elect their own member of parliament, could
muster their electoral weight.
27 Gaasbeek, ‘Bridging Troubled Waters?’, pp. 107–109.
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Figure 1. Trincomalee District: population size and ethnic composition per division.
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The one Muslim town that is big enough to secure parliamentary
representation—Kinniya—presents an interesting reversion of the
class-based electoral geography. The old town, known as Periya (big)
Kinniya, is home to land-owning farmers, but is considered a Sri Lanka
Freedom Party area, while the fishermen and wage labourers living at
the waterfront, in Sinna (small) Kinniya, form a United National Party
stronghold. This, my informants explained to me, has everything to
do with localized family politics. The Maharoof family, which has been
in politics for decades, happens to live in Sinna Kinniya, even though
they are very prosperous. They aligned themselves with the United
National Party and the neighbourhood largely fell in line with them.
In Periya Kinniya, Abdul Majeed became the central political figure in
the 1960s and 1970s. He comes from a very modest background, but
did well in school and ended up getting degrees from universities in
Mumbai and Chennai. He was a good orator, able to verbalize the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party’s socialist rhetoric of the time. He also secured
access to state largesse and his family is still respected for that reason.
Competition between ‘political families’—dynasties with an electoral
micro-territory—thus complicate the class-based picture, particularly
when the Muslim Congress came into play and opportunistic cross-
overs became centrally important following the introduction of the
proportional representation system.
Trincomalee carries some strategic and symbolic significance as
a navy harbour and a district situated between the north and east,
but this is not reflected in electoral politics. The District’s 334,000
inhabitants form a mere 1.66 per cent of the national population.
With just four members of parliament out of a 225-seat parliament,
Trincomalee is, in fact, Sri Lanka’s least influential electoral district.
But although the composition of the four seats is unimportant
nationally, people attach great value to it within the local political
dynamic (see Table 1).
Table 1 provides an overview of the dynamics and outcomes at
previous parliamentary elections and confirms some of the above
observations. First, the Muslim Congress has been a significant force
in the District since its creation. Its alignment with either the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party or the United National Party plays a major
role in the outcomes of elections. Secondly, the number of Muslim
members of parliament varies, but at any given time there is at least
one from Kinniya, the District’s biggest Muslim town. Thirdly, there
are ‘political families’. M. E. H. Maharoof represented the prominent
Kinniya family until his assassination in the late 1990s. His son Imran
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X13000528
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 09:23:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
1104 B A R T K L E M
Table 1



















• Leelaratne (Sinhala, Kantale,
UNP)
1989 13% 23% (1) 18% 22% (1) • Sivaprakashan (Tamil,
Trincomalee town,
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1994 24% (1) 20% 22% (1) 29% (2) •MEH Maharoof (Muslim,
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• Ranaweera (Sinhala, Kantale,
UNP)
• Thangathurai (Tamil, Muthur,
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• Najib Majeed (Muslim,
Kinniya, SLMC)
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(UNF) MPs (Muslim MPs in bold)




• Najib Majeed (Muslim,
Kinniya, SLMC)
• Jayantha Wijesekara (Sinhala,
Kantale, UPFA)
Source: Records of the parliamentary library, Kotte. Archival research was carried out
by Mr Ajiwadeen.
Note: The parties referred to above are: the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF),
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the
United National Party (UNP), and the United National Front (UNF).
Maharoof contested in 2010. The rival family is represented by Najib
Majeed, son of the famous Abdul Majeed (killed by the LTTE in
1987). Less visible political figures include the English teacher M.
S. Thowfeek, who replaced his murdered brother Baithulla in the
2000 polls, and the former physiotherapist Thideer Thowfeek, the
only Muslim from Muthur ever to be elected to parliament, a victory
he owed at least partially to his marriage: his wife is from Kinniya.
The 2010 parliamentary elections
What follows is a chronological narrative of the 2010 parliamentary
elections in the Muslim pockets of Trincomalee District. There were
fairly clear phases in the unfolding script of elections and the text
is organized accordingly: the aftermath of the presidential elections,
the nomination phase, campaigning, election day, and post-election
manoeuvring. As will become clear, the narrative in fact comprises
a number of interlacing storylines. The penultimate section will
untangle these different political narratives.
Aftermath of the presidential elections
Mahinda Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) successfully secured
his position at the presidential elections on 26 January 2010. He had
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scheduled elections early, to capitalize on the government’s military
victory over the LTTE in May 2009. The campaign became a neck-
and-neck race when Rajapaksa’s former army commander General
Sarath Fonseka fell out with the regime and ran for office himself.
However, Rajapaksa triumphed with a comfortable margin: 58 per
cent against 40 per cent for Fonseka. The re-elected government did
not waste any time settling scores. Fonseka was arrested and tried in
a dubious court case.
The majority of Trincomalee District had voted for Fonseka and
people were worried about retribution. The Navy reinstalled a fishing
ban (a common occurrence during the war), thus barring a significant
portion of the population from eking out a living. In subsequent days, a
round of bureaucratic transfers followed. Civil servants whose loyalty
to the government was in doubt were sent to less enviable locations.
Meanwhile, triumphant Sri Lanka Freedom Party organizers were
handing out kiribath (lumpy milk rice, often consumed to celebrate
auspicious moments) at their poster-plastered stalls. The tone for the
forthcoming parliamentary elections had been set.
Setting the stage: the nomination phase
Parliamentary polls were still over two months away, but already
featured saliently on the rumour circuit and in the newspapers,
because candidate lists were being drawn up. This stage of marshalling
forces is crucial, because it reorders political alignments. The ethnic
background of candidates, the inclusion of respected political families,
and the towns they represent strongly affect electoral decisions. People
in the District were very familiar with the underlying arithmetic. They
started speculating about how many thousand votes from which town
were secure for which party or candidate, and how many might swing.
The actual bargaining took place in backstage discussions in Colombo.
Potential candidates were not sighted in their towns for days or weeks
and they would only return for quick consultations with their local
advisers, organizers, and sympathizers.
The whole process was complicated, because for each of the
potential candidates, success was contingent on the choice of other
candidates. After all, the overall composition could unite or split
voting blocks. Constituencies wanted their candidate on the list, but
too many Muslim candidates would water down the vote. Smaller
Muslim pockets like Muthur, Thoppur, Kuchchaveli, and Pulmoddai
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needed to either pool their limited electoral mass or align themselves
with a politician from Kinniya. On top of the inter-town dispersion,
the community was divided on the aforementioned rights versus
development question: whether to vote for the government or the
opposition. The majority had voted against Mahinda Rajapaksa during
the presidential elections, because they were anxious about Sinhala
domination in the region. The leadership of the country’s main Muslim
party (the Muslim Congress) continued to toe that line, but many
voters felt that siding against the government was inadvisable with
the Rajapaksas firmly in power.
The gravitational pull of the government became clear to me when
I visited a local council chairman in one of the Muslim towns in the
District. The nearby road used to be interrupted by ferry crossings,
but these were replaced by brand-new bridges after the 2004 tsunami.
At one of these bridges, however, travellers were still directed to the
rusty ferry next to the bridge. This had more to do with politics than
with engineering, the council chairman explained. He had organized
a ceremonial bridge opening, but the chief engineer had closed it
again, because the chairman was a Muslim Congress politician and
thus belonged to the opposition. ‘I received calls from SLFP [Sri
Lanka Freedom Party] people telling me: “How can you open the
bridge? That’s a job for the government.” [ . . . ] The police came
and threatened me. Telling me, we have been appointed by the
government, so if you go against the government, we can’t help you.’
The chairman angrily told me the government’s days were numbered,
because ‘the people’ were fed up. ‘There’s no transparency, the cost
of living is high, the family influence is too big [he meant Rajapaksa
nepotism], there’s no space for opposition.’ He complained about other
Muslim politicians crossing over to the government, serving the petty
interests of their own constituency, while jeopardizing the larger cause
of the Muslim community.
When I met the council chairman a few weeks later, he had joined
the government himself. ‘There was no [other] way,’ he explained
sheepishly. The voters were shifting towards the government. The
Muslim Congress, he now thought, was stubborn not to do the same.
‘It creates a communal problem. Because the government thinks why
should we work for the people who vote for the opposition. [ . . . ]
There’s no way to work against the government. We have no power to
stop them. In the opposition, we can’t oppose the government.’ Weeks
later, the prime minister opened the bridge and the council chairman
attended the ceremony in the government ranks. He joined the
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campaign of Poonchanilama, a Sinhalese politician from Ratnapura,
to whom we will turn below.
On the opposite side of the District, in Muthur, the narrative was
almost entirely in sync. ‘Opposition is pointless,’ a school principal
from Muthur told us. He was considering running as a candidate for the
National Congress, a Muslim party that had joined the government,
and was negotiating with National Congress leader Athaulla. ‘But it
will be hard here. This is an SLMC [Muslim Congress] area.’ To verify
his chances, he was meeting with local leaders and representatives of
mosques and madrasas. In the end, he decided to withdraw. ‘I told
the people either we have to be all together or we’ll lose. [ . . . ] But I
concluded that the community was not ready to all unite under one
umbrella. Some Muslims would vote [Muslim] Congress; some decided
to go with Sinhala candidates of the government. Unfortunately there
are three candidates from Muthur. That will split the vote. So I told
Athaulla I can’t do it. [ . . . ] Athaulla said don’t worry. I will give you
a good position, a chairman of the board or something. But I did not
want to do that.’
‘Actually I hate politics,’ this abortive candidate confided, ‘and so
does my wife.’ Some of his friends advised him not to get into politics.
‘They told me I’m not ideal for politics. I’m not ready for the thuggery.’
The concern with the ‘dirty’ business of politics upset him, so much
so that he disappeared for the whole election period and went on a
pilgrimage in Mecca. ‘I was disturbed by the whole thing,’ he told me
afterwards. This personal sentiment reflects a broader concern that
elections and politics cause disturbances, unsavoury arrangements,
and threaten the unity of the community.28
There was fierce competition between candidates aspiring to have
a place on the government list (the United People’s Freedom
Alliance).29 With the electoral mood swinging towards President
Rajapaksa, bargaining positions changed. Candidates brokered
nominations on less advantageous terms. The main electoral
competition shifted from government–opposition antagonism to fierce
rivalry between government candidates, who were convinced that the
government would win, but were increasingly worried they might not
be part of its victory. Tellingly, my respondents had trouble working
28 For discussion, see Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State, pp. 79–84.
29 The United People’s Freedom Alliance was a compilation of the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party and junior partners. People simply called them ‘government’, however,
and to prevent confusion, so will I.
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(ex-SLMC)
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Note: The numerical order of the candidates is alphabetical in the Sinhala alphabet.
Source: Interviews and observations.
out the main opposition list (United National Front, encompassing
both the United National Party and the Muslim Congress). Typically,
they would know the Muslim Congress candidate from their town
(M. S. Thowfeek from Kinniya; Harees from Muthur), but had to
guess the names of the others. From the Tamil United Liberation
Front list, they only knew Sampanthan. Other lists—17 parties
and 14 independent groups in total for Trincomalee District—were
considered insignificant. The only list that really mattered was the
government’s (see Table 2).
Competition between two splinter groups of the Muslim Congress—
the National Congress and the All Ceylon Muslim Congress—had
enabled the government to grant both factions two nominations on
the Trincomalee District lists. The other three were given to Sinhala
candidates. The majority of government candidates in the District
were thus Muslim, but rather than a triumph, this was considered bad
news for the Muslim electorate. Their vote would be split between
four candidates, while the Sinhala vote would be divided by only
three. Similarly, the Muslim candidates were evenly split between
two Muslim towns: Kinniya and Muthur. A classic scenario of splitting
the vote was about to unfold.
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Canvassing and campaigning
Now that the cards had been dealt, a much more visible stage
started. Streets were plastered with posters of candidates and pictures
dramatizing their loyalties and accomplishments. Graffiti was used
to spray icons (parties) and numbers (candidates’ position on the
list). A green tree (the Muslim Congress) with a three referred to
M. S. Thowfeek; a blue betel leaf (government) with a seven was
Poonchanilama’s mark. Rather than a colourful spectrum of voting
options, particular streets tended to take on particular colours. Such
visual geography thus displayed the prospective strength of certain
areas and it was used to undermine others. One local Muslim Congress
politician complained to me that someone had sprayed a (government)
betel leaf on the parapet wall of his house. Others would chuckle over
such pinpricks. ‘Elections are like [a] pastime for the community,’ a
young man from Muthur explained to me. ‘Something is happening.’
And indeed, it was hard to escape election fever. The slogans, pictures,
and advertisements of contenders filled the newspapers; vans with
loudspeakers and honking cars would drive around until late at night
in otherwise lacklustre neighbourhoods.
Though most heavyweights had joined the government list, the
Muslim Congress (the United National Front’s main constituent in
Trincomalee) still enjoyed support. ‘The tree is our religion,’ staunch
Muslim Congress voters would say, and they would often invoke the
Muslim Congress’s historic role as a bulwark against the LTTE. Sitting
on Muthur’s moonlit beach, known Muslim Congress ground, a fisher-
man rehearsed the area’s historic encounters with the LTTE and the
government military for us. ‘When the end of the war came, we expec-
ted to go fishing independently,’ he concluded. But the Navy continued
to impose fishing bans, the most recent one because the fishermen had
voted for the opposition at the presidential polls. He went on:
Now you may think, why don’t these people accept that the government has
done a lot of help for them. Why don’t they just accept the government?
That’s true. That’s how we could think. But the government did not balance
the rights of the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims. For example, if
we have a problem with the Sinhalese people and we go to the police, they
will support the Sinhalese. [ . . . ] they will accept the Sinhalese version of
the story. They will always win. That’s the only reason we will vote SLMC
[Muslim Congress]. The government will always think about the majority.
Muslim Congress candidates and organizers tapped into these
sentiments during their ‘pocket meetings’. These were the most
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common form of campaigning and targeted the people living around
a given junction, typically at dinnertime when people were at home.
Party supporters decorated the junction with posters and festoons,
and installed loudspeakers to rehearse their key campaign issues, as
the local inhabitants gathered at the junction. Those who were less
interested or preferred not to be seen (the women, as well as foreign
researchers) would quietly listen in from their yards or houses. On
one of the United National Front meetings I attended, the speaker
alluded to the big battle in Muthur between the LTTE and the Army
in 2006:
Then it was only our Muslim brothers who helped us. If the government gets
two seats, they will both be Sinhala; if the UNF [United National Front]
gets two seats, both will be Muslim. [ . . . ] The Sinhalese are encroaching
on our land. We need to build a good leadership for the Muslims. Not just
development, we also need rights. [ . . . ] Najib [the incumbent candidate from
Kinniya] is not active. He is sleeping in parliament. [Names politicians who
crossed over to the government] are in place because of their Muslim votes.
When they joined the president they went against the Muslim Congress
and against the Muslim people. [ . . . ] The government has put four Muslim
candidates and three Sinhalese. It is a trick to split the Muslim vote.
The next evening, Muthur’s government candidate, the senior
bureaucrat Niyas (National Congress) organized a slightly bigger
pocket meeting on Main Street. Boys and men came over and lingered,
sitting on their bicycles and motorcycles. A university lecturer
from Kandy added prominence to the occasion. He extolled the
government’s road-building efforts and discredited Muslim Congress
leader Hakeem. ‘He will tell you if you vote for [the Muslim] Congress,
he’ll give you a seat on the national list. But that’s a lie. He promises
that everywhere. In Oddamavadi, he promises that. In Eravur, he
promises that. Everywhere, he says that. In Muthur, he will promise
the same thing.’ Niyas continued on the same note. ‘Hakeem is still not
here. If he comes to Muthur, the people will ask him for a place on the
national list, but he can’t give that. That’s the reason he does not come
to Muthur.’ Then, the speech was cut off by Azan (the call for prayer)
and the small crowd dispersed to one of the neighbouring mosques.
In brief, government candidates emphasized the virtues of
‘development’ (and the Muslim Congress’s impotence in delivering
largesse), while the Muslim Congress propagated the discourse of
Muslim ‘rights’ (and accused government candidates of squandering
these rights). It proved difficult to keep the two apart, though. Muslim
Congress candidates would also highlight post-war improvements in
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the infrastructure, but they would try to separate it from government
patronage. Government candidates in turn could not let go of the
Muslim minority discourse altogether.
My informants discussed these political dilemmas at length, but they
spent no less time chatting about the aesthetics of the performance
and personal virtues of the candidates. M. S. Thowfeek (Kinniya), for
example, was seen as a ‘normal’ man, uncharismatic but trustworthy.
Thideer Thowfeek (Muthur), on the other hand, was seen as a savvy
fixer, but partly because of that he was perceived as less dignified.
People often hinted at the fact that he tended to drink too much.
Najib Majeed (Kinniya) was typically portrayed as incompetent, but
commentators would not fail to pay tribute to the credentials of his
father Abdul Majeed.
In terms of putting on a show, and displaying political potency,
one man seemed to dwarf all these local candidates: Susantha
Poonchanilama. While local notables like Niyas were holding their
pocket meetings, Poonchanilama toured the District with a whole
caravan of buses, vans, three-wheelers, and motorcycles, all decorated
with flags, loudspeakers, and banners. On 21 March, the main
government rally at the cricket stadium of Trincomalee town started
with a massive security presence, followed by helicopters flying in
Prime Minister Wickremanayake. The rest of the town was deserted.
Inside the stadium, hundreds of spectators listened to the prime
minister, who delivered a thundering speech in Sinhala. On the stage
behind him sat tens of dignitaries—monks, ulama, priests, senior
citizens, and, of course, the government candidates. The familiar king-
size pictures of the president, the bridges, and the power plants to the
left and right completed the entourage. Most prominently displayed
on these pictures, apart from the president, was Poonchanilama.
Though he was from an entirely different region (Ratnapura), as
the district minister for ‘nation-building’—the government’s main
patronage channel to the northeast—Poonchanilama had ample
means to show his political muscle. People said that asphalt emerges
where he sets foot. Unlike most other candidates, he managed to
deliver construction work—roads, electricity supply, drainage—within
weeks, if not days. A man from Kinniya summarized the admiration
he aroused: ‘He’s like Spiderman. It’s like magic to the people.’ Less
powerful government candidates like Thideer Thowfeek and Niyas felt
overshadowed and spent as much energy preserving their vote base
from these ‘intruders’ as they did discrediting the opposition. Their
primary trump card was their connection to the local community.
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‘Imran [Maharoof, Muslim Congress] and Najib [Majeed,
government] have big families here,’ a man from Kinniya explained
to me, and their relations would be loyal to them. ‘They will get
some 1,000 votes just for that.’ Such patterns were even clearer in
small towns like Muthur where almost everyone knows everyone else,
through extended family, school, mosque or work. Muslim Congress
candidate Harees was a respected commerce teacher at the Central
College and used to preside over the local council: ‘everybody knows
him’. Nevertheless, a female teacher from Muthur explained that she
was inclined to vote for Niyas: ‘My brother married his sister. And
that sister works in my school.’ Thideer Thowfeek was her former
classmate. A senior townsman faced a similar situation. He was also
related to Niyas, who had, moreover, been one of his students. Thideer
Thowfeek was his wife’s former classmate. He was not going to vote for
them, however, because they had aligned with the government, ‘and
I’m SLMC [Muslim Congress]’. Personal loyalties thus complicated
political orientations to do with the Muslim cause and patronage.
He went on to explain that the neighbouring town of Thoppur was
particularly divided for this reason. The town has a relatively large
land-owning class and significant United National Party and Muslim
Congress constituencies, but they also felt indebted to the former
Kinniya politician Abdul Majeed. Now that his son Najib had crossed
over to the government, some people would ‘follow the family’, while
others would remain loyal to the United National Front (comprising
the United National Party and the Muslim Congress).
As election day approached, people were increasingly confident
about their predictions. They all agreed on a few counts: the
government would secure two of the four seats in Trincomalee
District. One of them would be Gunawardana, who had a solid
base in the Sinhala-dominated parts of the District: ‘He’s already
selected.’ The United National Front would get one seat: most
likely M. S. Thowfeek from Kinniya. The Tamil leader Sampanthan
(Tamil United Liberation Front) would also get his seat. For
my Muslim informants with an interest in politics, there were
only two uncertainties left. First, which of the six remaining
government candidates would win the second government seat? And—
importantly—would it be a Muslim or a Sinhalese? Second, there was
the wild card of the national list. Theoretically, unelected candidates
could still be rewarded by their parties.
As the contours of the victories and defeats started to emerge
on the map, campaigning dynamics intensified. Last-ditch efforts to
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‘break’ block votes or tip the balance developed a nastier tone. On
the night of 5 April, one of my interlocutors did not turn up. He was
stuck in Thoppur, because violence had erupted between government
and Muslim Congress supporters. The skirmish prevented Niyas from
holding his final rally (electoral protocol disallowed rallies after that
night). My informants also reported a clash in Kinniya between
supporters of Poonchanilama and Najib Majeed, both of whom—
interestingly—campaigned on a government ticket. On a different
day, government supporters had fallen out with those of Muslim
Congress candidate M. S. Thowfeek. These skirmishes were met
with a combination of excitement and disapproval. Either way, they
were a predictable part of the electoral plot. In fact, my respondents
explained, the level of violence was low, compared to other elections,
mainly because the government seemed confident it would win.
Moreover, the clashes occurred between people who belonged to
the same community. ‘They are all relatives,’ a man from Kinniya
reminded me. ‘They may argue, but they won’t kill each other.’
Election day and results
And, indeed, despite the skirmishes in the last week before the
elections, the atmosphere on election day (8 April) was very calm
in Muthur, Kinniya, and the surrounding villages. People gradually
swarmed to their polling station, often in small groups, taking their
children and grannies along. Both men and women turned up, often
in separate groups. In each ward or village, a school or other public
building had been equipped with polling booths. Policemen guarded
the premises and civil servants from all kinds of departments had been
recruited for ‘election duty’ to ensure that the registration, the placing
of ink on the voter’s fingertip, the voting, and counting was properly
done. Public buses were chartered to transport people from remote
locations to their polling stations, something of a luxury for these
villagers. Voters undertook their franchise as an honourable task.
They dressed up and there was a strong sense of duty and dignity in
the way they arrived at the polling stations, voted, and departed again.
Although the turnout at the elections was relatively low—both in
the District (62 per cent) and nationally (61 per cent)—the elections
were somehow present in everyone’s minds, at every corner, in every
conversation. After voting, the men sat together to speculate about the
outcomes. Many people knew someone on ‘election duty’, and rapid
exchanges of text messages started to inject bits of evidence into the
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latest predictions. People knew how many thousands had voted for
whom in which area and soon their friends and relations from Muslim
pockets elsewhere in the country started sending their estimates over.
People were making bets and jokes, boasting about the certain victory
of their favourite, while their companions would not believe any of
it and predicted a dramatic loss of face. When I walked through
Muthur with a known Niyas supporter, one of the groups promised
him: ‘If Niyas gets even 10,000 votes, I will buy you a van.’ All roared
with laughter including—if blushingly—my friend. Election day thus
brought together a fascinating mix of the dignified performance
of citizenship, street-corner joking, and speculation—and the
anticipation of possible trouble, because past experience had shown
that the celebration of electoral triumphs could easily degenerate
into another clash. People in fact started to brace themselves for the
prospective outcomes. Some of them even put up new posters of the
candidates they thought would win, not because they voted for them,
I was told, but to prevent themselves from being accused of disloyalty!
The official results were announced on national television
throughout the night, but the next morning, the Trincomalee District
results were still not out. The Elections Commissioner had ordered
a re-poll after an incident in Kumburuputty, south of Kuchchaveli. A
small group of (reportedly drunk) people had come and intimidated
the voters, telling them to ‘vote for number seven’ (Poonchanilama).
The incident attracted some attention, because it was one of two
places where a re-poll was ordered (a bigger disruption took place in
Nawalapitiya, near Kandy), but everyone knew the re-election on 20
April would make no difference: only 977 voters were registered at
the polling station.
Counting in all other areas finished on 10 April. When the results
were announced, the newspapers left no room for doubt. Page-wide
headings of ‘historic wins’ and triumphant pictures applauded the
government victory. Official results for Trincomalee (and Kandy) were
withheld on that date, but the text message circuit made them a
public secret. The local pundits had proven their predictive skills. The
government had indeed secured two seats, while the United National
Front (United National Party and the Muslim Congress) and the Tamil
United Liberation Front both got one. It was also little surprise that
Gunawardana won one of the government seats (19,734 preference
votes) and that veteran Tamil leader Sampanthan secured the Tamil
United Liberation Front seat (24,488 votes). As predicted, Kinniya’s
Muslim Congress man M. S. Thowfeek topped the United National
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Front list (23,588), though his junior townsman Imran Maharoof
(heir of the Maharoof dynasty) came close (19,665). The revelation
was that Poonchanilama, the only candidate from outside the region,
captured the other government seat. With 22,820 votes, he in fact
came well ahead of Gunawardana. The present member of parliament
Najib Majeed—who had been accused of sleeping in parliament—was
sent home (15,906); his townsman Sabarula (8,829), and Muthur’s
candidates Thideer Thowfeek (5,096) and Niyas (4,299) all placed
last on the government list.
Celebrations started throughout the District. Elected candidates
travelled around to thank their voters. These festivities also raised
some concerns: if a Muslim Congress figurehead visited a mosque in a
government-affiliated area, this could easily lead to trouble. One such
incident occurred in Kuchchaveli, I was told by a Muslim woman living
there. Muslim Congress supporters came with a caravan of ten or 15
cars, collecting more and more people on the way, to celebrate M. S.
Thowfeek’s victory. They expected a festive welcome in this Muslim
pocket, but instead encountered a group of government supporters,
who started to throw stones at them. Such escalations were reported
to me with an undertone of disapproval, lamenting the divisive force
of politics. Tellingly, the sermon at the Jumma prayer in Muthur the
day after the elections was about unity, my research assistant told me.
‘The imam said Muslims should be peaceful after the elections. We
are all brothers. We had the elections, but we all want to live here
together. We are all Muslims. We will face each other again. We’ll be
at each other’s funerals.’
Post-election manoeuvring
Nationwide, the government secured 144 seats (but would soon reach a
two-thirds majority of 150 seats as opposition members of parliament
started crossing over). The United National Front’s seats dwindled to
just 60, of which eight (including two national seats) were Muslim
Congress. The Sinhala leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—with
Sarath Fonseka at the helm—retained a mere seven members of
parliament. The Tamil United Liberation Front secured most of the
Tamil vote with 14 seats. None of the numerous other factions and
independent candidates managed to get elected.
In Trincomalee, the composition of the government candidate list
had ruptured the Muslim vote. Respondents from the smaller Muslim
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pockets blamed the Kinniya electorate, which had failed to stand
united (with about 12,400 votes for both the government and the
United National Front). They had provided the government with
sufficient votes to take two seats, but failed to make sure that at
least one of these was Muslim. People from Kinniya explained that
when they turned away from the ‘lethargic’ Najib, there was no good
alternative on the government list. The second Kinniya candidate—
Sabarula—was considered chanceless and the other two Muslim
candidates were from Muthur.
For Muslim voters the result was an electoral tragedy: both
government members of parliament were Sinhala (Poonchanilama
and Gunawardana). The Muslims were practically cut off from
government patronage and the District’s only Muslim member (M.S.
Thowfeek, Muslim Congress) sat in a severely weakened opposition.
Neither ‘rights’ nor ‘development’ had been served. Hope was vested
in two last resorts: a crossover or a national seat. Given the deplorable
result, the United National Front had only nine national seats to
distribute, of which the United National Party leadership gave two to
the Muslim Congress. Hakeem, the leader of the Muslim Congress,
faced the tedious task of meeting the demands of his fragmented
and dispersed vote base. In Muthur, a big Muslim Congress meeting
was held on 12 April to pressure Hakeem to grant Harees a national
seat (with 10,820 votes, the town’s candidate had come second on
the list), but Hakeem decided otherwise. A crossover by the District’s
only Muslim member of parliament (M. S. Thowfeek) was the only
remaining possible access to government, but he remained loyal
to the Muslim Congress. Months later, all eight Muslim Congress
members of parliament would leave the United National Front to
join government ranks, but they got little in return for their belated
support. Divisions within the Muslim community—between parties,
between towns, between families—thus resulted in a deception. As
a minority overshadowed by a Sinhala-led government and Tamil
separatists, Muslims tend to emphasize their need to stand together,
but internal division had reared its head once more.
Interlacing storylines
The preceding electoral narrative consists of several interlacing
storylines, and—importantly—there are tensions between them. First,
there is the narrative of performing citizenship. Much in line with the
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anthropological literature that conceives of elections as a political
ritual, elections provide a stage for people to exercise their franchise
and thus enact their membership of a nation. Poor villagers, whose
opinion normally carries little power, are transported by public buses,
present themselves in front of state officials at the polling station, and
by casting their vote, they take part in a national political ceremony,
which is televised and affects the most powerful people in the country.
Seen in this light, it is unsurprising that we witnessed families
dressed up in their best clothes, exhibiting decorum, dignity, and
duty. These particular elections carried an additional symbolic charge.
They marked the government’s military victory over ‘terrorism’, which
enabled President Rajapaksa to belabour his patriotic credentials.
There is of course a difference between ‘citizens’ and ‘patriots’
and this became quite clear in the way the government treated its
political opponents. Rajapaksa’s presidential re-election set the tone
for the parliamentary election campaign. Fonseka ended up in jail
and the opposition crumbled. The channels of patronage tightened.
Supporters got kiribath, opponents got transferred.
Muslim politics comprises a second storyline. The Muslims navigate
between the ethno-nationalism of the Sinhala majority and the ethno-
separatism of the Tamil minority. In short, the resulting tensions pivot
on a trade-off between Muslim rights (mainly driven by anxieties over
Sinhala or Tamil domination) and development (the need to be in
government and secure benefits). The Muslim Congress originated
as a political project to give voice to a besieged minority group and
a significant number of Muslims hang on to the minority rights
discourse, because ‘the government will always think about the
majority’. Fear of ‘colonization’ and fishing bans reinforced their
concerns over Sinhala dominance. In line with other recent work
on Sri Lankan Muslims,30 activating the boundary between Muslims
and other ethnic groups comes to the fore as a vital part of the
political equation. Yet, on the other hand, Muslim voters see the
need for patronage, and in the post-war political landscape, many felt
‘opposition is pointless’. Muslim politicians have to walk a tightrope,
because they cannot afford to drop the Muslim identity issue nor
disengage from minority-related issues, but an overly militant position
blocks access to government largesse.
30 Haniffa, ‘Piety as Politics’; Hasbullah and Korf, ‘Muslim Geographies’; Klem,
‘Islam, Politics and Violence’; McGilvray, ‘Sri Lankan Muslims’.
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While the competition for patronage partly explains the fissures
in the Muslim polity, this is clearly not the whole story. After all,
many people vote for candidates who would neither be able to deliver
on minority rights, nor on material welfare. That brings us to the
third electoral storyline: town-based identities, political families, and
personal loyalties. These dynamics play a significant role in people’s
voting decisions and these intra-Muslim forms of belonging severely
complicate the preceding storylines. The rivalry between Muslim
towns is fierce. Kinniya’s demographic weight has long fuelled the
exclusion of smaller settlements. These towns, in turn, are made up
of voting blocks along lines of class and/or neighbourhoods. And these
patterns are complicated by political families to whom voters feel
loyal or indebted. Seemingly mundane considerations—‘my brother
married his sister’—thus intervene in more fundamental political
concerns over the plight of the Muslim community.
During the 2010 elections, the Muslim vote was divided between
government (patronage) and opposition (minority rights), by rivalry
between a big town (Kinniya) and smaller constituencies (Muthur),
and by loyalties to contentious political dynasties. This latter dynamic
was complicated by a local succession crisis in Kinniya. Imran, the
Maharoof’s coming man, was still very junior and Abdul Majeed’s son
Najib had failed to deliver as a member of parliament. With no obvious
replacement from Kinniya on the government list, the vote dispersed.
In the end, Kinniya lost its direct access to government. The smaller
towns tended to vote for the Muslim Congress, but ironically the only
Muslim Congress candidate to be elected was from Kinniya (M. S.
Thowfeek). To the agony of my Muslim respondents, this candidate
was the only Muslim member of parliament, even though Trincomalee
District is one of very few places in Sri Lanka where Muslims form
the biggest ethnic group (45 per cent). It was unprecedented that
both government members of parliament from Trincomalee were
Sinhalese. And the biggest winner was in fact an ‘imported’ politician:
Susantha Poonchanilama from Ratnapura.
Conclusions
The flurry of activity described in this article confirms that elections
involve more than collective deliberation over the composition
of government. Spencer’s conceptualization of elections as ‘moral
dramas of identity and difference’ provides an insightful vantage point.
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Elections involve the crafting (and recrafting) of political identities,
the activation (and deactivation) of political boundaries, and the
forging (or severing) of political loyalties. Rather than focusing on
the exclusive realm of rational interests and consensus-seeking, this
article places central emphasis on the antagonism between ‘us’ and
‘them’, friends and foes.
The crucial political question is: which ‘us’ and which ‘them’?
This article’s narrative brought forward different—and often
contradictory—ways of defining political communities. The enactment
of national citizenship, the preoccupation with ‘the Muslim people’,
and the tensions around personal ties to locality-based political
families propagated different political identities and affinities. During
the election period, different kinds of antagonism continued to play
a role. The prevalence of one us–them divide over other antagonisms
clearly is an outcome of hard political work. Let me elaborate on this
in the two conclusions below.
First, the interaction between these different identity layers makes
the person, the community, and the nation more significant to each
other. For a brief period, landless peasants and fishermen become
citizens with a vote. Family relations are no longer just about
weddings and favours, they tap into the nation’s politics. Turf battles
between towns find a new platform for contestation. Big men visit
tranquil villages to deliver speeches and they actually keep last-minute
promises. The claiming of territory by displaying posters, the show of
force through massive rallies, the performance of loyalty by sitting
on stage, and the decorum of queuing up for the ballot booth—such
political performance makes voters part of a national contest and that
is why these acts assume prominence. This conclusion tallies very
well with the anthropological body of work on the ritual qualities of
elections.31 Voting indeed is more than arithmetic, it comprises the
performance of franchise and the dignified enactment of citizenship.
Second, the confluence of different storylines sheds light on the
sense of rupture and disturbance that tends to accompany elections.
It elucidates why communities—however adamant they are on
preserving their unity—fall prey to the divisive forces of politics.32
Trincomalee’s Muslims had to show their colours on multiple fronts.
They are quite adept at this chameleon-like behaviour, but elections
31 Banerjee, ‘Democracy, Sacred, and Everyday’; Bertrand, Briquet and Pels,
Cultures of Voting; Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State.
32 Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X13000528
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 09:23:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
S H O W I N G O N E ’ S C O L O U R S 1121
cause difficulty, because their allegiances may clash. Being a loyal
family member, a good townsman or a respectable Muslim is difficult
enough within one of the storylines, but being them all at once can
create trouble when they engender divergent voting imperatives. This
opens up a whole register of contradictions. It was these contradictions
that left Muslims voters with such a disappointing outcome in April
2010, which also harboured a threat to their everyday lives. There
were several violent clashes and people feared that ‘wrong’ alignments
would invoke punitive actions. The story of communities putting
up posters after elections to avoid accusations of being oppositional
was one stark reminder that there was more at stake here than
parliamentary seats.
This case study raises more fundamental observations about politics
in Sri Lanka and South Asia at large. The interaction between different
kinds of identity struggles is central to ‘the political’. Apparent ‘master
antagonisms’—be they ethno-separatism in Sri Lanka,33 communal
riots in Gujarat34 or caste politics in West Bengal or Uttar Pradesh35—
remain connected to other us–them rivalries and political trajectories.
This opens up additional dimensions of rupture and contestation: the
political landscape is complicated by even more forms of struggles,
which are not a mere derivative of national politics. But it also opens
up space for political performances across the entrenched lines of
contention, for example, through the dignified enactment of national
citizenship, or through more localized registers that offset the received
political categories. Although the elections were a time of licence
and antagonism, Trincomalee’s voters also realized they had to keep
political divisions within bounds. They knew the imam was right in the
Jumma sermon after the elections: after all, they would all be seeing
each other again at the next funeral or local festivity. The interaction
between multiple forms of political antagonism thus not only sheds
light on the moral dramas of elections, it also directs us to the long
periods between the political highpoints of election fever, periods in
which people also enact different identities and belongings, but often
manage to keep the unruly and divisive potential of the political at
bay.
33 Bastian, ‘Electoral Systems’; Uyangoda, ‘Ethnic Conflict’; Venugopal,
‘Cosmopolitan Capitalism’; Wickremesinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age.
34 Berenschot, Riot Politics; Spodek, ‘In the Hindutva Laboratory’.
35 Doron, ‘Caste Away?’; Roy, ‘Caste and Power’.
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